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Abstract—Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology allows
composable programming across private Ethereum blockchains.
It allows for inter-contract and inter-blockchain function calls
that are both synchronous and atomic: if one part fails, the
whole call graph of function calls is rolled back. It is not based
on existing techniques such as Hash Time Locked Contracts,
relay chains, block header transfer, or trusted intermediaries.
BLS Threshold Signatures are used to prove to validators on
one blockchain that information came from another blockchain
and that a majority of the validators of that blockchain agree
on the information. Coordination Contracts are used to manage
the state of a Crosschain Transaction and as a repository of
Blockchain Public Keys. Dynamic code analysis and signed nested
transactions are used together with live argument checking to
ensure execution only occurs if the execution results in valid
state changes. Contract Locking and Lockability enable atomic
updates.
I. INTRODUCTION
Atomic Crosschain Transactions [1] for permissioned
Ethereum blockchains [2] allow for inter-contract and inter-
blockchain function calls that are both synchronous and
atomic. Atomic Crosschain Transactions are special nested
Ethereum transactions that include additional fields to facilitate
the atomic behaviour securely. The technology has been de-
signed to shield application developers from the complexity of
crosschain transactions by incorporating the required changes
into the Ethereum Client software.
Fig. 1 shows a system of blockchains. Enterprises are
indicated by the colour of lines between two blockchains.
For example, the enterprise represented by the green lines
has nodes on blockchains A, C, D, X, and Y; the enterprise
represented by the blue lines has nodes on blockchains A,
B, D, and X; and the enterprise represented by the red
lines has nodes on all blockchains. Using Atomic Crosschain
Transaction technology, an enterprise can create a crosschain
transaction who’s call graph can traverse any blockchain they
have a node on. The Coordination Blockchains are used to
hold the cross transaction state. All nodes on all blockchains
processing a crosschain transaction need to be able to access
the Coordination Blockchain referenced in a crosschain trans-
action.
Fig. 2 shows code fragments from two contracts on two
blockchains. The function funcA in contract ConA on Private
Blockchain A calls the function funcB in contract ConB
on Private Blockchain B. Atomic Crosschain Transactions
allow the crosschain function call to occur synchronously
and atomically. By synchronously it is meant that function
calls that return results can be executed and the results are
immediately available and that all execution will complete
and updates will be committed prior to the end of the Atomic
Crosschain Transaction. By atomic it is meant that the updates
are either applied on both blockchains, or the updates are
discarded on both blockchains.
Atomic Crosschain Transactions technology does not rely
on Time Hash Lock Contracts [3], relay chains [4], block
header relaying [5], [6], or trusted intermediaries. It is a new
technique which brings together BLS Threshold Signatures,
nested transactions, and dynamic parameter checking against
expected signed values, and a Coordination Blockchain as a
holder of crosschain transaction state and as a time-out time
reference.
Section II Components describes the concepts behind the
technology. Section III Transaction Processing walks through
happy case and failure case transaction processing. Section IV
Application Development discusses considerations that should
be considered when creating applications with this technol-
ogy. Section VI Analysis describes the Safety and Liveness
properties of this technology.
Source code for this technology is available on github.com
[7].
II. COMPONENTS
A. Nested Transactions
Atomic Crosschain Transactions are nested Ethereum trans-
actions and views. Transactions are function calls that update
state. Views are function calls that return a value but do
not update state. Fig. 3 shows an Externally Owned Ac-
count (EOA) calling a function funcA in contract ConA
Fig. 1: Cross-Blockchain Linkage
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2Fig. 2: Function Calls across Blockchains
Fig. 3: Originating Transaction containing Two Nested Subor-
dinate Transactions and a Subordinate View
on blockchain Private Blockchain A. This function in
turn calls function funcB, that in turn calls functions funcC
and funcD, each on separate blockchains. The transaction
submitted by the EOA is called the Originating Transaction.
The transactions that the Originating Transaction causes to
be submitted are called Subordinate Transactions. Subordinate
Views may also be triggered. In Fig. 3, a Subordinate View is
used to call funcC. This function returns a value to funcB.
Fig. 4 shows the nested structure of the Atomic Cross-
chain Transaction. The EOA user first creates the signed
Subordinate View for Private Blockchain C, contract
ConC, function funcC and the signed Subordinate Transac-
tion for Private Blockchain D, contract ConD, func-
tion funcD. They then create the signed Subordinate Trans-
action for Private Blockchain B, contract ConB, func-
tion funcB, and include the signed Subordinate Transac-
tion and View. Finally, they sign the Originating Transaction
for Private Blockchain A, contract ConA, function
funcA, including the signed Subordinate Transactions and
View.
Fig. 4: Nested Transactions and Views
B. Actual and Expected Parameter Values
When a function executes in the Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chine [8] function parameter values and stored state com-
bine to form the actual values of variables during execu-
tion. For example, consider funcB in contract ConB on
Private Blockchain B in Fig. 2. Assuming _param1
is 1, state1 is 2, state2 is 4, and that funcC returns
the value 6, then function funcC will be called with the
parameter value 1, and function funcD will be called with the
parameter value 10. To execute this as part of a Crosschain
Transaction, signed Subordinate Transactions and View need
to be created with the appropriate parameter values.
Execution of a transaction or view fails if the actual param-
eter values passed to a function does not match the values in
the signed Subordinate Transaction or View. The parameter
values in the signed Subordinate Transaction or View are
the values the application developer expected to be passed
to the function. The expected values can be determined at
time of nested transaction creation using dynamic program
analysis techniques. In particular, the dynamic analysis needs
to consider program flow. For instance, if state1 was 1, then
funcD would not be called, and no Subordinate Transaction
should be included in the Crosschain Transaction for this
function call. This ensures that Subordinate Transactions and
Views are executed on the exact state that was intended at the
time of creation of the crosschain transaction.
C. Per-Node Transaction Processing
When the EOA submits the Originating Transaction to a
node, the node processes the transaction using the algorithm
shown in Listing 1. If the transaction includes any Subordinate
Views, they are dispatched and their results are cached (Lines
1 to 3). The function is then executed (Lines 4 to 17). If a
Subordinate Transaction function call is encountered, the node
checks that the parameter values passed to the Subordinate
Transaction function call match the parameter values in the
signed Subordinate Transaction (Lines 6 to 8). If a Subordinate
View function call is encountered, the node checks that the
parameters passed to the Subordinate View function call match
the parameter values in the signed Subordinate View (Lines 9
and 10). The cached values of the results of the Subordinate
View function calls are then returned to the executing code
(Line 11). If the execution has completed without error, then
each of the signed Subordinate Transactions is submitted to a
node on the appropriate blockchain (Nodes 18 to 20).
Listing 1: Originating or Subordinate Transaction Processing
1 For All Subordinate Views {
2 Dispatch Subordinate Views & cache results
3 }
4 Trial Execution of Function Call {
5 While Executing Code {
6 If Subordinate Transaction function called {
7 check expected & actual parameters match.
8 }
9 Else If Subordinate View function is called {
10 check expected & actual parameters match
11 return cached results to code
12 }
13 Else {
14 Execute Code As Usual
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 For All Subordinate Transactions {
319 Submit Subordinate Transactions
20 }
D. Blockchain Signing and Threshold Signatures
BLS Threshold Signatures [9], [10] combines the ideas of
threshold cryptography [11] with Boneh-Lynn-Shacham(BLS)
signatures [12], and uses a Pedersen commitment scheme [13]
to ensure verifiable secret sharing. The scheme allows any M
validator nodes of the total N validator nodes on a blockchain
to sign messages in a distributed way such that the private
key shares do not need to be assembled to create a signature.
Each validator node creates a signature share by signing the
message using their private key share. Any M of the total N
signature shares can be combined to create a valid signature.
Importantly, the signature contains no information about which
nodes signed, or what the threshold number of signatures (M)
needed to create the signature is.
The Atomic Crosschain Transaction system uses BLS
Threshold Signatures to prove that information came from
a specific blockchain. For example, in Fig. 3, nodes on
Private Blockchain B can be certain of results re-
turned by a node on Private Blockchain C for the
function call to funcC, as the results are threshold signed
by the validator nodes on Private Blockchain C. Sim-
ilarly, validator nodes on Private Blockchain A can
be certain that validator nodes on Private Blockchain
B have mined the Subordinate Transaction, locked contract
ConB and are holding the updated state as a provisional update
because validator nodes sign a Subordinate Transaction Ready
message indicating that the Subordinate Transaction is ready
to be committed.
E. Multichain Nodes
A Multichain Node is a logical grouping of one or more
blockchain validator nodes, where each node is on a different
blockchain. The blockchain nodes operate together to allow
Crosschain Transactions. The Multichain Node on which the
transaction is submitted must have Validator Nodes on all
of the blockchains on which the Originating Transaction and
Subordinate Transactions and Views take place.
Fig. 5 shows four enterprises that have validator nodes on
Private Blockchain A to Private Blockchain
D. Alice who works in Enterprise 1 can submit Atomic
Crosschain Transactions that span Private Blockchain
A to Private Blockchain D as Enterprise 1 has a Mul-
tichain Node that includes validator nodes on each blockchain.
However, Bob who works in Enterprise 4 can only sub-
mit Atomic Crosschain Transactions that span Private
Blockchain B and Private Blockchain C as Enter-
prise 4 only has validator nodes on Private Blockchain
B and Private Blockchain C.
F. Crosschain Coordination
Crosschain Coordination Contracts exist on Coordination
Blockchains. They allow validator nodes to determine whether
the provisional state updates related to the Originating Trans-
action and Subordinate Transactions should be committed or
discarded. The contract is also used to determine a common
time-out for all blockchains, and as a repository of Blockchain
Public Keys.
Fig. 5: Multichain Nodes
When a user creates a Crosschain Transaction, they specify
the Coordination Blockchain and Crosschain Coordination
Contract to be used for the transaction, and the time-out for
the transaction in terms of a block number on the Coordi-
nation Blockchain. The validator node that they submit the
Originating Transaction to (the Originating Node) works with
other validator nodes on the blockchain to sign a Crosschain
Transaction Start message. This message is submitted to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes
on all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has com-
menced.
When the Originating Node has received Subordinate Trans-
action Ready messages for all Subordinate Transactions, it
works with other validator nodes to create a Crosschain Trans-
action Commit message. This message is submitted to the
Crosschain Coordination Contract to indicate to all nodes on
all blockchains that the Crosschain Transaction has completed
and all provisional updates should be committed. If an error
is detected, then a Crosschain Transaction Ignore message is
created and submitted to the Crosschain Coordination Contract
to indicate to all nodes on all blockchains that the Crosschain
Transaction has failed and all provisional updates should be
discarded. Similarly, if the transaction times-out, all provi-
sional updates will be discarded.
G. Contract Locking and Provisional State Updates
When a contract is first deployed it is marked as a Lockable
Contract or a Nonlockable Contract. A Nonlockable Contract,
the default, is one which can not be locked. When a node
attempts to update the state of a contract given an Originating
or Subordinate Transaction, it checks whether the contract is
Lockable and whether it is locked. The transaction fails if the
contract is Nonlockable or if the contract is Lockable but is
locked.
Figure 6 shows the locking state transitions for a contract.
The Crosschain Coordination Contract will be in Started state.
The act of mining an Originating Transaction or Subordinate
Transaction and including it in a blockchain locks the contract.
The contract is unlocked when the Crosschain Coordination
4Fig. 6: Contract Locking States
Contract is in the Committed or Ignored state, or when
the block number on the Coordination Blockchain is greater
than the Transaction Timeout Block Number. The Crosschain
Coordination Contract will change from the Started state to the
Committed state when a valid Crosschain Transaction Commit
message is submitted to it, and it will change from the Started
state to the Ignored state when a valid Crosschain Transaction
Ignore message is submitted to it.
Ordinarily, all nodes will receive a Signalling Transaction
indicating that they should check the Crosschain Coordination
Contract when the contract can be unlocked. When a node
first processes a transaction, it will set a local timer which
should expire when the Transaction Timeout Block Number
is exceeded. If the node has not received the message by the
time the local timer expires, the node checks the Crosschain
Coordination Contract to see if the Transaction Timeout Block
Number has been exceeded and whether the updates should
be committed or ignored.
H. Crosschain Transaction Fields
Originating Transactions, Subordinate Transactions, and
Subordinate Views contain the fields shown in Table I. Some
of the information in the standard Ethereum transaction fields
are exposed to blockchain application contract code, such as
the value field via the Solidity code msg.value. The new
extended crosschain transaction fields are made available to
blockchain application contract code via a precompile contract.
All nodes that process the transaction check that the
Coordination Blockchain Id, Crosschain Co-
ordination Contract, Crosschain Transaction
Time-out, Crosschain Transaction Id, and
Originating Blockchain Id are consistent across
the transaction or view they are processing, and the nested
Subordinate Transactions and Views. The nodes also
check that the To address and From Address, and the
blockchain identifier obtained from the V field and the From
Blockchain Id match across transactions and views.
The To address is the address of the contract containing
the function called on a blockchain. For example, the function
(f1) in contract (c1) could call a function (f2) in another
contract (c2) on the same blockchain (b1). The second contract
(c2) could call a function (f3) in a contract (c3) on another
blockchain (b2) via a Subordinate Transaction. The From
Address of the Subordinate Transaction will match the To
address of the transaction on the first blockchain (b1). This will
be the address first contract (c1). It will however, not match
the address of the second contract (c2), which is the function
that caused the Subordinate Transaction to be triggered.
Field Description
Standard Ethereum Transaction Fields
Nonce Per-account, per-blockchain transaction number.
GasPrice Amount offered to pay for gas for the transaction.
GasLimit Maximum gas which can be used by the transaction.
To Address of the account to send the value to, or the
address of a contract to call.
Value Amount of Ether to transfer.
Data Encoded function signature and parameter values.
V Part of the transaction digital signature & blockchain
identifier this transaction must execute on.
R Part of the transaction digital signature.
S Part of the transaction digital signature.
Additional Crosschain Transaction Fields
Type Type of crosschain transaction (e.g. Originating
Transaction)
Coordination Blockchain identifier of Coordination Blockchain to
Blockchain Id use for this transaction.
Crosschain Address of the Crosschain Coordination Contract
Coordination to use for this transaction.
Contract
Crosschain Coordination Blockchain block number when this
Transaction transaction will time out.
Time-out
Crosschain Identifies this crosschain transaction.
Transaction Id
Originating Blockchain identifier of the blockchain the
Blockchain Id Originating Node is on.
From Blockchain identifier of the blockchain that the
Blockchain Id function call executed on that resulted in this
Subordinate Transaction or View being submitted.
From To address from the transaction or view that resulted
Address in this Subordinate Transaction or View.
Subordinates List of Subordinate Transactions and Subordinate
Views that are called directly from this transaction
or view.
TABLE I: Crosschain Transaction Fields
Fig. 7: Sequence Diagram
III. TRANSACTION PROCESSING
A. Happy Case
Fig. 7 shows a sequence diagram showing an example se-
quence of execution, based on the calls in Fig. 3. The sequence
starts with an Externally Owned Account (EOA) submitting
a Crosschain Transaction to a node on Blockchain A. This
nested transaction contains the Originating Transaction, and
all Subordinate Transactions and Views, plus a time-out in
terms of Coordination Blockchain block numbers. The node
is known as the Coordinating Node for this transaction.
The nodes on Blockchain A cooperate to threshold sign
the Start message. The signed Start message is submitted
to the Coordination Contract on the Coordination Blockchain
specified in the Originating Transaction (and all Subordinate
Transactions and Views). The Coordination Contract on the
Coordination Blockchain accepts the Start message if its
5signature can be verified with the public key registered for
Blockchain A. The Start message contains the time-out block
number, which the Coordinating Contract registers when it
accepts the Start message. Once the Start is registered, the
Crosschain Transaction is in Start state.
The Coordinating Node then Trial Executes the Originat-
ing Transaction. Assuming the code executes correctly, the
Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain B is dispatched. The
Originating Transaction is then submitted to Blockchain A’s
transaction pool. When the transaction is included in a block,
the contract’s updated state is stored as provisional state, and
the contract state is locked.
The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain B contains a
Subordinate View for Blockchain C. The Subordinate View
is dispatched to a node on Blockchain C. The node on
Blockchain C completes a Trial Execution of the Subordinate
View at a certain block number. The node then cooperates with
other Blockchain C nodes to have the result of the Subordinate
View at the specific block number threshold signed. The node
returns the signed result to the calling node on Blockchain B.
The nodes on Blockchain B that do not contain the correct
version of Blockchain C’s public key fetch it from the Co-
ordination Contract. The node Trial Executes the Subordinate
Transaction, returning the value from the Subordinate View
to the code when the function corresponding to the Subordi-
nate View is called. Assuming the Trial Execution executes
correctly, then the Subordinate Transaction to be executed
on Blockchain D is dispatched to a node on Blockchain D.
The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain B is submitted to
Blockchain B’s transaction pool, with the signed Subordinate
View result from Blockchain C attached. When the transaction
is included in a block, the contract’s updated state is stored as
provisional state, and the contract state is locked. The nodes
on Blockchain B then cooperate to threshold sign a Ready
message, indicating that the blockchain is ready to commit
the Atomic Crosschain Transaction. The message is submitted
to the Coordinating Node.
The Subordinate Transaction for Blockchain D is trial
executed. There are no Subordinate Transactions or Views for
the transaction that need to be dispatched. The transaction is
mined. When the transaction has been included in a block,
the updated state is stored in provisional state, the contract is
locked, and the nodes on Blockchain D cooperate to threshold
sign a Ready message, indicating that the blockchain is ready
to commit the Atomic Crosschain Transaction. The message
is submitted to the Coordinating Node.
When the Coordinating Node (on Blockchain A) has re-
ceived Ready messages for Blockchain B and D, and the
Originating Transaction has been mined, then the nodes on
Blockchain A then cooperate to threshold sign a Commit mes-
sage. This message is uploaded to the Coordination Contract
on the Coordination Blockchain. Assuming this message is
uploaded prior to the time-out, the Crosschain Transaction is
then in the commit state.
The Coordinating Node requests that nodes on other
Blockchains commit a Signalling Transaction. When a node
on a blockchain encounters a Signalling Transaction for a
certain Crosschain Transaction, it checks the Coordination
Contract for the Crosschain Transaction to check to see if the
transaction should be committed or ignored. If the transaction
is to be committed, then all contract provisional state related
to the transaction is converted to normal state, unlocking the
contracts. If the transaction is to be ignored, then the contract
provisional state is discarded and the contract state is updated,
unlocking the contracts.
B. Failure Cases
If an error is detected then nodes on Blockchain A can
cooperate to create a threshold signed Ignore message which
is uploaded to the Coordination Contract to indicate to all
nodes that the Crosschain Transaction should be abandoned,
all provisional state updates should be discarded and contracts
should be unlocked. If an Ignore message can not be created,
or if the Crosschain Transaction times-out, then the state
returned by the Coordination Contract indicates the Crosschain
Transaction should be abandoned.
When nodes on each blockchain first become a part of
a Crosschain Transaction, they set a timer to expire when
they expect the Crosschain Transaction to time-out, plus a
random additional wait period. The timer is cancelled when
a Signalling Transaction is received. If a node’s timer expires
prior to receiving a Signalling Transaction, the node checks
the Coordination Contract and then creates and submits a
Signalling Transaction to indicate to other nodes that the
updates should be committed or ignored, and that the contract
should be unlocked. The additional random wait period is used
so that all nodes on the blockchain don’t simultaneously send
Signalling Transactions.
IV. APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT
A. Design for Locking
Contracts that have state updated as part of a crosschain
transaction are locked. Calls to those locked contracts will
fail until they are unlocked. Traditional contracts that hold
registries of information, which may need to be accessed by
many users at the same time, such as ERC 20 contracts, need
to be refactored to work successfully in a crosschain scenario.
They should be restructured such that there is a non-lockable
router contract that determines the appropriate lockable item
contract.
Fig 8 shows how an ERC 20 contract could be refactored.
Each account could have one or more lockable ERC 20
Payment Slot contracts. The non-lockable ERC 20 Router
contract’s code could be written such that transfers are sent
from an account’s payment slot contract that isn’t locked
which has adequate funds to a payment slot for the destination
account that is not currently locked. In this way, multiple
payments may be executed in parallel.
B. Application Level Authentication
As with traditional Ethereum transactions, the type of
application level authentication required for a Crosschain
Transaction will be application dependent.
1) No Authentication: Many functions will need no authen-
tication at all. That is, functions can be designed such that it
is safe to execute a transaction or return results of a view to
any caller who is able to access the function.
6Fig. 8: ERC 20 Contract for Crosschain
2) Using msg.sender or tx.origin: From the per-
spective of each Originating Transaction, Subordinate Trans-
action or View, msg.sender and tx.origin operate in
the same way as a standard Ethereum transaction. That is,
if an EOA submitted a transaction that called a function in
contract A that then called a function in contract B on the
same blockchain, msg.sender for contract B is contract A,
and is the EOA for contract A. In both cases tx.origin
would be the EOA. In the context of a node processing
an Originating Transaction, Subordinate Transaction or View,
for the purposes of msg.sender and tx.origin, the
transaction or view appears as a separately signed transaction.
Given the similarities with standard Ethereum, msg.sender
and tx.origin could be used in the same way as standard
Ethereum to authenticate which EOA or contract on the same
blockchain called a function call using code similar to that
shown in Listing 2.
Listing 2: Checking msg.sender
1 function receiver() external {
2 require(msg.sender == authorisedAddress);
3 ...
4 }
A key difference between standard Ethereum views and
Subordinate Views is that Subordinate Views are signed. As
such, the variables msg.sender and tx.origin can be
used within Subordinate Views, whereas they are not set in
the context of normal Ethereum views (except for the case of
msg.sender when one contract calls another contract).
3) From Blockchain Id, From Address, and Originating
Blockchain Id: If a contract needs to only respond to calls
from a certain contract on a certain blockchain, then the
code in Listing 3 should be used. The code checks that
the From Blockchain Id and From Address match
the authorised blockchain and address, and checks that
the blockchains represented by From Blockchain Id
and Originating Blockchain Id are semi-trusted. By
semi-trusted it is meant that fewer than M validators oper-
ating the blockchain are Byzantine. Note that this scenario
implies the contract should allow for any msg.sender and
tx.origin.
Listing 3: Crosschain Application Authentication
1 function receiver() external {
2 address fromAddr = infoPrecompile(FROM_ADDR);
3 uint256 fromBcId = infoPrecompile(FROM_BCID);
4 uint256 origBcId = infoPrecompile(ORIG_BCID);
5 require(fromAddr == authorisedFromAddress);
6 require(fromBcId == authorisedFromBcId);
7 require(origBcId == authorisedOrigBcId);
8 ...
9 }
V. USAGE SCENARIOS
The following sections introduces example scenarios, based
on real world use cases, to illustrate how the Atomic Cross-
chain Transaction technology could be leveraged to achieve
the desired outcome(s).
A. Travel Agent Use Case
This use case demonstrates how the well known ‘Hotel
and Train’ problem can be solved. In this scenario, the travel
agent needs to ensure the atomicity of the combined booking
transaction. In other words, the travel agent needs to ensure
that they either book both the hotel room and the train seat,
or neither, so that they avoid the situation where a hotel
room is successfully booked but the train reservation fails,
or vice versa. There are several private blockchains involved:
the travel agency runs a private blockchain, and each hotel and
train travel company also maintains its own private blockchain.
Fig. 9 illustrates the crosschain function calls to book a
hotel room and reserve a seat on a train. Travel Agent A
purchases ERC20 tokens on the hotel and train blockchains,
which they can then use to pay for accommodation and travel.
As can be seen from this diagram, atomic behaviour is mainly
enforced via contract locking, so that the lock remains in place
until both booking transactions have been signalled as having
completed successfully.
Hotel Blockchain Train Blockchain
Hotel Room 
Reservation 
Contract
Train Seat 
Reservation 
Contract
Travel Agency A 
Blockchain Booking System Contract
Lockable contract
Standard contract
ERC-20
Contract
ERC-20
Contract
Travel 
agent A
Fig. 9: Travel Agent Use Case - One Agent
This simplified version of the problem fails as soon as there
is more than one travel agent trying to book the same hotel
and/or train. For example, when the originating transaction
from Travel Agent B initiates the subordinate crosschain
function call to the hotel reservation contract (Fig. 10) before
the previous crosschain function call graph from Travel Agent
A had completed, the call will fail as the hotel reservation
contract will still be locked. Although no funds would have
been expended by Travel Agent B, this is clearly causing a
bottleneck.
However, by adjusting the design of the ‘Hotel and Train’
reservation system and its use of the Atomic Crosschain Trans-
action technology, we can leverage this functionality without
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Hotel Room 
Reservation 
Contract
Train Seat 
Reservation 
Contract
Travel Agency A 
Blockchain Booking System Contract
Travel Agency B 
Blockchain Booking System Contract
Lockable contract
Standard contract
ERC-20
Contract
ERC-20
Contract
Travel 
agent A
Travel 
agent B
✗ Call fails due 
to locked contract
Fig. 10: Travel Agent Use Case - Locking failure
the bottleneck shown in Fig. 10, as well as avoiding deadlocks.
One approach is to introduce non-lockable router contracts, the
green rounded rectangles depicted in Fig. 11, for both the hotel
and train travel companies. These reservation router contracts
are aware of every room’s availability and status (provisional
booking, booked, free) and similarly the reservation router
contract on the train travel company blockchain. Moreover
there are modified ERC20 contracts on both the hotel and
train blockchains so that the travel agencies can pay for the
hotel room and train seat. These modified ERC 20 contracts
consist of a router contract and payment slot contracts, where
each account has one or more payment slots. Following the
crosschain function call graph illustrated in Figure 11 it is
evident that two travel agents could now simultaneously book
hotel rooms and reserve train seats, by leveraging the Atomic
Crosschain technology described in this paper.
Fig. 11: Travel Agent Use Case - Locking failure
B. Supply Chain Selective Privacy with Selective Trans-
parency
In many commercial applications, a vendor may wish to
publish information to regulators to demonstrate regulatory
compliance, or to customers to provide assurances of product
provenance. With only a single, global, blockchain, all details
of a transaction must be published and will be visible to all
participants of the global blockchain. The vender may prefer,
for example, to keep the identities of its suppliers secret
from competing vendors. Selective privacy allows a vendor
to publish only the subset of transaction information that is
required by regulation or customer assurance, but maintain
the secrecy of confidential business details.
An example scenario is illustrated in Fig. 12 on page 7
where a customer is able to access details of the product
being purchased from the vendor, such as its origin (place(s) of
production and processing), and any certification (e.g. organic)
which is noted on the product’s label.
Fig. 12: Supply Chain Use Case
In this scenario, there are three blockchains:
• A Supply Chain blockchain which maintains all of the
transactions between a vendor and its suppliers.
• A Regulatory Compliance blockchain that includes mem-
bers of the Supply Chain, an Auditor and an Organic
Certifier Regulator. This chain includes all data needed
to guarantee regulatory compliance, but without the con-
fidential business details found in the Supply Chain.
• A Product Provenance blockchain which holds all the
information required to assure customers of various as-
pects of the goods being purchased. For example, the
authenticity of the product’s claim of being organic or
“Fair Trade” goods, and the place of production of the
product, including the entire (or partial) production chain
of the goods. The latter is especially important with
respect to a systems approach to pest risk management
that encompasses more environmentally friendly tech-
niques [14].
The use of Atomic Crosschain Transactions in this scenario
will enable the Product Provenance blockchain to request the
compliance of a product which is purported to be organic.
Only the status of the certification is returned to the Prove-
nance chain from the Regulatory Compliance blockchain, with
details of the assessment remaining private to members of the
Regulatory Compliance blockchain. Based on the outcome of
the atomic crosschain call, a QR code can be generated and
added to the Product Provenance blockchain. The suppliers
can use this QR code to print onto their product labels, which
a customer can then scan to retrieve the product information.
8Similarly, events in the Supply Chain blockchain can be
published selectively to the both the Regulatory Compliance
blockchain and the Product Provenance blockchain. This fa-
cilitates the application of both selective privacy and selective
transparency. Moreover, Atomic Crosschain Transactions en-
sure that any piece of information that needs to appear in more
than one blockchain appears in all the necessary blockchains
or, if a failure occurs, in none of them.
C. Reading from Oracle Chains
An Oracle Chain is a blockchain that maintains a set of data
that is valuable to other blockchain applications. One example
is currency exchange when value is transferred between two
blockchains that are using different currencies. The Oracle
chain may serve as the authoritative source for the rate of
exchange between the two currencies. Both the sender and
receiver consult the Oracle Chain to be assured that the
transaction is properly credited. Fig. 13 illustrates the Oracle
Chain use case.
Fig. 13: Oracle Chain Use Case
A simple implementation of this scheme may lead to some
risk if the exchange rate is volatile. Either by accident, or due
to malicious interference, the two parties may obtain different
values from the Oracle Chain. Without proper safeguards, this
may cause an inconsistency in the recorded transaction. The
possibility of such inconsistencies is unacceptable, and offers
the opportunity for malicious actors to corrupt the integrity of
the system.
If the consultation of the Oracle Chain is done as part
of an Atomic Crosschain Transaction, we can ensure that
both parties receive the same value from the Oracle chain,
or in the case of an error, neither party receives a response.
This guarantees that either the transaction completes, with a
consistent value on both sides, or the transaction is aborted
with no value transferred.
D. Ephemeral Blockchain Archiving
In practice blockchains may only be required to exist for
a limited time, for example to execute a business deal or
perform a particular function that is short-lived. To illustrate
this functionality, we consider the sub-division of land. During
the acquisition, development application, approval process,
site works, site inspections and finally registering the blocks,
various blockchains may exist. However, once plan sealing has
taken place and all the blocks of land have been registered as
separate titles, some blockchains are no longer relevant and
become obsolete, while others may need to persist.
The example scenario in Fig. 14 on page 9 demonstrates
the use of Atomic Crosschain Transaction technology where
the Developer on the Construction blockchain submits a view
call to the Development Application (DA) blockchain to write
relevant details of DA conditions affecting the work on site
(e.g. tree clearing, tree retention, and sewer pipes) that need
to be inspected by Council or the Utility companies (e.g. Elec-
tricity, Water, Sewer), to the DA chain. The project manager,
also a participant of the Site Works blockchain, is then able
to check on the regulatory compliance of DA conditions and
schedule inspections by the relevant Authorities.
Moreover, progress of site construction work, early warning
of potential delays, scheduling the different site works, and
issuing progress claim assessments to the site operator to raise
an invoice for progress payments, can all be recorded on the
Construction blockchain. As inspections are completed, the
outcomes are recorded on the Site works blockchain, which is
periodically queried via a crosschain view call from the DA
blockchain, so that the conditions that have been attached to
the approval of the development application can be tracked
and dates of inspections added to the DA blockchain.
Once plan sealing has been obtained, the plan is submitted
to the Land Registry office to process and issue titles for
each of the newly created blocks. Although the plans have
been sealed by Council, an atomic function call is necessary
from the Land Registry blockchain to the DA blockchain to
get compliance information, dates and other details before the
Land Registry checks can be completed. All conditions need
to be satisfied before titles can be issued. Once titles have been
issued, they will be recorded on the Land Registry blockchain
and the Site Works and DA blockchains can be archived.
The advantage of a blockchain approach to land sub-division
with atomic crosschain capability is that it provides irrefutable
evidence of the compliance with development application
conditions across different areas so that Land Registry can
more readily process and register titles.
VI. ANALYSIS
Typically, any desired property of a distributed system
can be expressed as a combination of safety and liveness
properties. Similarly, the atomicity property of the atomic
crosschain protocol can also be seen as a combination of safety
and liveness properties. In general, the safety property captures
the notion that bad states are not reachable, and the liveness
property captures the notion that good states are eventually
reached. For atomicity, the safety property translates to: when
the protocol finishes, the whole crosschain transaction gets
either committed or rolled back, the liveness property states
that: the atomic crosschain transaction protocol eventually
(after finite amount of time) terminates. We present a more
formal discussion here.
Limit on the number of Byzantine nodes. Consensus pro-
tocols invariably has a limit on the number of Byzantine nodes
in a network. For example, proof-of-work protocol requires
the number of Byzantine nodes to be less than half of the
total number of nodes. Similarly, IBFT and IBFT2 protocols
have a limit of one-third the total number of nodes. Because
our atomic crosschain protocol is built on top of consensus
protocols, we require and assume that the conditions for the
correct operation of the consensus protocols are met. In other
words, we inherit the same limit on the number of Byzantine
nodes from the dependant consensus protocol.
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Theorem 1 (Safety). Suppose that the atomic crosschain
protocol has finished executing a crosschain transaction c.
Then:
• if c succeeds then the protocol successfully commits
the state updates of all the associated (originating and
subordinate) transactions,
• if c fails then the protocol rolls back the state updates of
all the associated transactions.
Proof. We prove by case analysis of all possible states of the
crosschain transaction c recorded in the coordination contract.
• not-started This is possible only if c fails before the
state of the coordination contract is updated to started.
At this point neither the Originating Transaction nor the
Subordinate Transactions has started to execute. Hence
there is nothing to rollback.
• started We show that this situation is not possible. The
coordination contract has received the start message from
the originating chain, but not the commit or ignore mes-
sage. Based on the time-out specified in the start message,
the nodes on the originating chain start their respective
local timers, after processing the Originating Transaction.
Similarly, the nodes on the subordinate chains start lo-
cal timers after processing their respective Subordinate
Transactions. After the timers expire, the nodes look up
the state of c in the coordination contract. In case of
any failure in processing the Originating Transaction or
in one of the Subordinate Transactions, the originating
chain would have updated the coordination contract to
ignored state. Also, the state of the coordination contract
is updated to ignored state when there is a time-out. So,
when c is processed (either successfully or not) the state
of c in coordination contract can only end up in committed
or ignored, after having been in the started state.
• committed It means that the coordination contract re-
ceived the threshold signed commit message from the
originating chain. After submitting the commit message,
originating blockchain’s coordinating node messages all
the validators in its chain and other coordinating nodes
on the Subordinate Transaction blockchains to check the
state of the coordination contract. If it is Byzantine, then
the local timers on the nodes (of all participating chains)
expire and the nodes look up the coordination contract
for the state of c, and find that c is committed. They then
commit their local provisional states. Hence the whole
transaction c is committed.
• ignored This is possible when either the coordinating
node on the originating chain has sent an ignore message,
or c has timed out, and the coordination contract updates
the state of c to be ignored. Nodes will commit or
roll back their provisional states only after looking up
the coordination contract. In this case all nodes on all
participating chains roll back their updates, implying that
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the whole crosschain transaction c is rolled back.
Theorem 2 (Liveness). Suppose the atomic crosschain proto-
col is started, meaning, a crosschain transaction is submitted
to a coordinating node on the originating blockchain. Then,
the atomic crosschain protocol protocol will eventually (after
a finite number of steps) finish.
Proof. The intuition of the proof is simple. The protocol itself
has a finite number of steps. Also, as the start message is
submitted, all validator nodes on all participating chains start
their local timer. This ensures that the whole transaction will
time out eventually, in case there are indefinite delays.
We consider the special case when the crashing (or be-
coming Byzantine) of nodes might prevent the protocol from
terminating. The crashing of other nodes are governed by
the dependant consensus protocol. Hence we assume that we
always have a minimum number of nodes to be non-Byzantine
as dictated by the consensus protocol. We examine if crashing
a coordinating node introduces indefinite waits, which implies
that the protocol does not terminate.
• Suppose the coordinating node on the originating chain
crashes before submitting the crosschain transaction start
message to the coordination contract. Then no other
chain knows about this crosschain transaction and this
transaction is terminated and deemed to have failed.
• Suppose the coordinating node on the originating chain
crashes after submitting the start message but before sub-
mitting the commit message, then the whole transaction
times out. The local timers on validator nodes of the
originating blockchain time out, look up the coordination
contract, find the transaction is ignored, and abort the
transaction. The subordinate chains complete the execu-
tion of views or transactions and send their Subordinate
Transaction ready messages to the coordinating node
of the originating chain. Because the coordinating node
of originating chain has crashed, they observe that the
state of the coordinating contract is never changed to
committed, and the validator nodes on all participating
chains will eventually time out, look up the coordination
contract (which is set to ignored after time out), and abort
the transaction.
• Suppose the coordinating node on originating chain
crashes after submitting the crosschain transaction com-
mit message to the coordination contract. Then (validator
nodes on) all chains see the committed state of coordi-
nating contract and will commit the transaction.
• Suppose the coordinating node on a subordinate chain
crashes. Then it cannot send the Subordinate Transaction
ready message to the originating chain. The coordinating
node on the originating chain keeps waiting and times
out. The coordination contract gets updated to ignored
state and the transaction terminates and is rolled back.
Establishing the liveness property is very useful as it implies
the properties of termination and deadlock-free.
VII. CONCLUSION
Atomic Crosschain Transactions allow application devel-
opers to create complex cross-blockchain applications in a
straightforward manner. It does this by absorbing the vast
majority of the complexity required to deliver this behaviour
using a novel combination of technologies.
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